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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE ) BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON ) PETITIONERS
and W. FRED HURST
Appellants/Petitioners,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the
State of Utah,
Respondents/Agencies.

Case No. 20040376
]
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS /PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E.
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
I
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2) (a) confers appellate
jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals to review
appeals resulting from the final orders of formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies.

This case is an

appeal by Appellants/Petitioners Dan Leatham, Robert E.
Steele, Tim Slocum, Harold W. Johnson and W. Fred Hurst
(herein the * Petitioners") from a final order issued by the
Utah Career Service Review Board (herein the U CSRB"), a

State agency, on April 14, 2 004, which final order was
styled, "Decision and Final Agency Action" (herein the
"CSRB's Decision") /
II
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the CSRB err by determining that an employee's

objective fear of retaliation by management can never, as a
matter of law, constitute excusable neglect so as to toll
the twenty (2 0) working day limitation period for the filing
of a grievance under U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (a) (i&ii) (1999)?
This issue was preserved below at R. 000268; R. 000419-431.
Standard of Review:

This issue involves one of general

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the CSRB's Decision below.

Taylor v. Dep't of

Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
2.

Did the CSRB commit reversible error by failing to

make any finding(s) of fact to support its legal conclusion
that Petitioners' excusable neglect was extinguished such
that the twenty (20) working day limitation period expired
prior to the filing of Petitioners' grievance?

This issue

was preserved below at R. 000425-430.
Standard of Review:

This issue involves one of general

1. A copy of the CSRB's Decision is set forth in the
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit A.
2

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the CSRB's Decision below.

Taylor v. Dep't of

Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
3,

Did the CSRB commit reversible error by

determining that the twenty (20) working day limitation
period was not tolled due to the misconduct of the Utah
Department of Corrections (herein "the UDOC")?

This issue

was preserved below at R. 000423-424, 000473.
Standard of Review:

This issue involves one of general

law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference
given to the CSRB's Decision below.

Taylor v. Dep't of

Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
Ill
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the
case on appeal and each of the following are attached as a
part of the Addendum as Exhibits E through L (pursuant to
Rules 24(a) (6) and 24(a) (11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure):
1.

Constitutional provisions:
a.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (Open
Courts Provision).
3

2.

Statutes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

3.

U.C.A.
U.C.A.
U.C.A.
U.C.A.
U.C.A.
U.C.A.

67-19-3.1(g)(2000).
67-19a-101, et. seq. (1991).
67-19a-202(l)(a&b)(1991).
67-19a-303(3) (1991) .
67-19a-401(4) (a&b) (1999) .
67-19a-401(5) (a&b) (1999) .

Administrative Rules:
a.
b.

CSRB Administrative Rule R137-1-2(2004).
Department of Human Resource Management Rule
R477-8-6(8) (c) (i&ii) (1998) .
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A,

CASE NATURE, COURSE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Petitioners filed their grievance2 on January 30, 199 8,

requesting they be made whole for on-call time they worked
but which had not been paid to them by the UDOC.

R. 000004.

On May 22, 2000, UDOC's Administrative Law Judge, R. Spencer
Robinson, (herein UALJ Robinson"), conducted a hearing at
the departmental level in the grievance process and
submitted his Report and Recommendation (herein

XX

ALJ

Robinson's Report") to UDOC's then Executive Director Mike
Chabries (herein n Mr. Chabries).

R.000015.3

ALJ Robinson

2. It is undisputed that Petitioners were career service
employees who are statutorily authorized to pursue
resolution of disputes through the grievance process enacted
by the Legislature and which is codified at U.C.A. 67-19a101, et seq. (1991).
3.

A copy of ALJ Robinson's Report is set forth in the
4

determined that Petitioners were entitled to receive on-call
time as requested in their grievance and concluded that Mr.
Chabries had the statutory discretion to provide Petitioners
with up to one (1) year of on-call compensation that accrued
prior to the date of their grievance.

R. 000018.

On January 19, 2 001, Mr. Chabries accepted ALJ
Robinson's Report that Petitioners were entitled to receive
the on-call compensation that they sought, but then Mr.
Chabries limited the award of compensation to the twenty
(2 0) working day time period preceding the filing of
Petitioners' grievance.4

R. 000023-24.

Petitioners then

timely advanced their grievance to the Career Service Review
Board on or about February 5, 2001.

R. 000004.

On or about May 2, 2 001, the UDOC filed a Motion to
Dismiss and a Motion in Limine in the proceedings before the
CSRB.

UDOC's Motions were premised on the theory that

Petitioners were not entitled to receive any on-call
compensation beyond the twenty (20) working days authorized
by Mr. Chabries in his January 19, 2 001, decision.

After

briefing, and on October 12, 2001, CSRB Hearing Officer K.
Allan Zabel (herein H.O. Zabel) concurred with the UDOC's
position and granted UDOC's Motion in an Order styled
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit C.
4. A copy of Mr. Chabries7 decision is set forth in the
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit D.
5

"Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine
including Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision."

R. 000193. On October 20, 2001, Petitioners

filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CSRB.

R.

000203. On December 26, 2001, H.O. Zabel issued his decision
denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss.
0002 51.
the CSRB.

R.

On January 2, 2 002, Petitioners timely appealed to
R. 000380.

On October 3, 2002, the Career Service Review Board
("CSRB") issued an Order of Remand directing H.O. Zabel to
conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding whether Petitioners
could demonstrate excusable neglect regarding any delay(s)
in the filing of their grievance.

R. 000337-339.

After an

evidentiary hearing, H.O. Zabel issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision after Remand.5
376.

R. 0003 64-

Petitioners again timely appealed to the CSRB on

January 20, 2003.

R. 000385.

After briefing and oral argument, the Career Service
Review Board entered its final order on April 14, 2004,
styled ''Decision and Final Agency Action," upholding H.O.
Zabel's decision and limiting Petitioners' requested relief
to twenty (2 0) working days prior to the filing date of
5. A copy of H.O. Zabel's decision is set forth in the
Addendum submitted herewith as Exhibit B.
6

their grievance.

R. 000490-519.

On May 12, 2004,

Petitioners timely filed their Petition for Review of Final
Administrative Agency Action with the Utah Court of Appeals.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of filing their original grievance on

January 30, 1998, Petitioners were management career service
employees in the Utah Department of Corrections' (herein the
"UDOC") and were assigned to the Division of Institutional
Operations.6

R. 000015.

During the period from January of 1992 until July of
1997, the UDOC was under the direction of a prior
administration headed by then Executive Director Lane
McCotter (herein u Mr. McCotter").
(Transcript p. 30-32).

R. 000365; R. 000525

During Mr. McCotter's reign, and

prior administrations, Petitioners were directed not to
submit time sheets that included any on-call time but were
required to work on-call time for which they were not paid
any on-call compensation. R. 000015; R. 000525 (Transcript
p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159).

During this time

6. Petitioners Dan Leatham and Tim Slocum remain employed
by the UDOC. Petitioners Harold W. Johnson, W. Fred Hurst,
and Robert E. Steele retired from the UDOC subsequent to the
filing of the grievance.

7

period, Petitioners were informed by the UDOC executive
personnel that Petitioners were not entitled to be paid for
on-call time because their positions were designated as
"FLSA exempt."
During the period commencing in June of 1997 through
the filing of their grievance on January 30, 199 8,
Petitioners were paid on-call compensation for those limited
circumstances wherein they were designated as the ''officer
in charge" (herein

xx

OIC")-

R. 000015; R. 000525 (Transcript

p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159).

The UDOC continued,

however, to mislead Petitioners regarding Petitioner's
entitlement to additional on-call compensation they were
owed by virtue of being assigned commute vehicles, and by
being required to have cell phones and pagers.

R. 000525

(Transcript p. 115-118, 140-141, 150-151, 157-159).

The

UDOC has not disputed that Petitioners were entitled to
receive on-call compensation in addition to those periods
when they were not in an on-call status as the OIC.
Prior to July of 1997, UDOC has not disputed that
Petitioners had an objective fear that, if they challenged
the management/personnel practices of the UDOC
administration, they would be subjected to retaliatory

8

transfers or other negative personnel actions.
17, 000373, 000375.

R. 000015-

H.O. Zabel explicitly found Petitioners

objectively feared retaliation from the UDOC administration
prior to July of 1997 and that the same constituted the
necessary excusable neglect that would warrant the tolling
of the timelines for Petitioners to file their grievance.7
H.O. Zabel's determination was based on several instances of
retaliatory misconduct by the UDOC administration that
personally involved Petitioners or in which Petitioners had
knowledge through performance of their duties.8
It is only after H.L. "Pete" Haun (herein "E.D. Haun")
was appointed Executive Director of the UDOC in July of 1997
that the issue of Petitioners' objective fear of relation is
in dispute.9 Unfortunately, neither H.O. Zabel, nor the

7.

See, Exhibit B in the Addendum at page 10 (R. 000373).

8. In H.O. Zabel's decision dated January 8, 2 0 01, he made
Supplemental Findings of Fact numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
17, 18, 23 and 24 which included explicit findings of
intimidation, coercions and reprisals by the UDOC personnel
identifying at least ten (10) specific instances of
retaliation against employees for filing grievances or
complaints against the UDOC. R. 000364-376. See, also,
Exhibit B in the Addendum at pages 2-5.
9. After ALJ Robinson issued his Report in May of 2000,
E.D. Haun ordered Plaintiffs to attempt to resolve their
grievance by meeting with Mr. Haun's designee, Scott Carver.
R. 00022. At the meeting, no offer was ever made by the
9

CSRB, have identified at what point in time, if ever,10
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation allegedly
evaporated between July of 1997 and the filing of
Petitioners' grievance on January 30, 1998.

Petitioners'

objective fear of retaliation constitutes excusable neglect,
thereby entitling Petitioners to relief beyond the twenty

UDOC, but rather Mr. Carver told the Petitioners that the
filing of their grievance is "just something you don't do
over this kind of issue." R. 000525 (Transcript p. 125-126,
164-166); R. 000368 (Supplemental Findings of Fact no. 23
and 24). Mr. Haun subsequently retired from the UDOC
without issuing a final decision on ALJ Robinson's Report.
Mr. Chabries replaced Mr. Haun and thereby had the
obligation to make the final departmental decision required
by the statutory grievance process. Significantly, the UDOC
did not call Mr. Chabries to testify regarding why he had
limited Petitioners' compensation to the twenty (20) working
day time period preceding the filing of Petitioners'
grievance.
10. .Id. Given Mr. Carver's attitude at the xxsettlement
meeting" identified in footnote 9, supra, Petitioners submit
their objective fear continued through the date of the
evidentiary hearing before H.O. Zabel. Ironically, E.D.
Haun's uncontroverted and unchallenged testimony at the
evidentiary hearing before H.O. Zabel was that it takes up
to seven (7) years to change an institutional culture with a
fear of retaliation, particularly for an institutional
culture as deeply seated as the UDOC. R. 000525 (Transcript
p. 206-207); R. 000367-368 (Supplemental Findings of Fact
no. 17). When asked whether the fear of retaliation had
completely dissipated in the UDOC during his reign, Mr. Haun
replied, "Not totally, I'm not naive." R. 000525 (Transcript
p.206, line 3 through p.207 line 21). The UDOC did not
present any evidence (either through its own witnesses or
cross-examination) identifying what date it believed
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation had ceased.
10

(2 0) working days preceding the filing of their grievance.
IV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The excusable neglect exception (to the

twenty (20) working day limitation period contained in
U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(a)(1999)) constitutes a statutory
tolling mechanism that implements the Legislature's intent
that employees may pursue grievances without reprisal as set
forth in U.C.A. 67-19a-303(3) and 67-19-3.1(g).
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation triggered the
excusable neglect exception to the twenty (20) working day
statute of limitations provided in U.C.A. 67-19a401(5)(a)(1999), thus tolling the twenty (20) working day
statute of limitations.

Absent an explicit finding of fact

specifying the date that Petitioners' excusable neglect
abated, the CSRB committed reversible error that warrants
reversal of the CSRB's Decision.
POINT II:

The UDOC's misconduct tolled the application

of the twenty (2 0) working day limitation until such time as
Petitioners obtained actual knowledge of the UDOC's
concealment/misconduct.

Petitioners thereafter timely filed

their grievance warranting reversal of the CSRB's Decision.

11

ARGUMENT
I
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO ON-CALL COMPENSATION
FOR A TIME PERIOD BEYOND TWENTY (20) WORKING DAYS
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THEIR GRIEVANCE
A. Petitioners' Excusable Neglect Tolled the Twenty (20)
Working Day Statute of Limitations Applicable to the Filing
of Grievances by Career Service Employees.
In U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (a&b) (1999), the Legislature has
enacted a twenty (20) working day limitation period for the
filing of grievances by career service employees, to-wit:
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements
for excusable neglect11 established by rule, an
11. Given the unparalleled brevity of the statute of
limitations applicable to a career service employee's right
of file a grievance, Petitioners would submit the "excusable
neglect" exception reflects an apparent Legislative intent
to implement a xxtolling" of the twenty (2 0) working day
limitation period. See, generally, Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d
742, 753 (Utah 2002)(statute may impose "discovery rule"
tolling applicable statute of limitations). To hold
otherwise would potentially result in the complete
abrogation/vitiation of a career service employee's right to
file a grievance because state agencies could willfully
violate an employee's rights without trepidation because the
scope of the remedy to the employee is limited to only
twenty (2 0) working days in the absence of excusable
neglect. Moreover, a rigged and inflexible twenty (2 0)
working day limitation period may present constitutional
deficiencies under Utah Open Courts Clause because such a
short time period essentially deprives employees of any
effective remedy. See, Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357
(Ut.Ct.App. 1993)(three (3) month statute of limitation
period for filing of habeaus corpus petition is
unconstitutional, inter alia, the three (3) month period is
too brief). Further, by standing on a "hard and fast"
twenty (20) working day rule, the CSRB is fomenting and
encouraging employees to immediately file grievances lest
12

employee may submit a grievance for review under
this chapter only if the employee submits the
grievance:
(i) within 2 0 working days after the event
giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 2 0 working days after the employee
has knowledge of the event giving rise to the
grievance.12
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an
employee may not submit a grievance more than one
year after the event giving rise to the
grievance. U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5) (1999).
(emphasis supplied)
their rights will be quickly foreclosed. Petitioners do not
believe the Legislature intended such a result because it
would obviously be counterproductive to an efficient and
harmonious workplace.
12. Id. Additionally, subsection (i) appears to
contemplate that an employee who has actual knowledge of the
event giving rise to a grievance, sans excusable neglect, is
required to file his/her grievance within twenty (2 0)
working days but an employee without actual knowledge of the
event giving rise to his/her grievance has twenty (2 0)
working days after receipt of actual knowledge of the event
in which to file his/her grievance. The Legislature thus
imposed an actual knowledge standard not a notice (i.e.,
knew or should have known) standard. Further, these two (2)
subsections, when read in conjunction with the prefatory
excusable neglect language in U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(a),
suggests the Legislature intended to provide for a tolling
of the limitations period in the circumstance where the
employee lacks actual knowledge of the event giving rise to
the grievance.
13. Although this section appears to be a statute of repose
that would be unconstitutional under Berry ex rel. Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and its
progeny, Petitioners would, in all likelihood, not have
appealed to the CSRB if Mr. Chabries had authorized payment
of on-call time for the year preceding the filing of their
grievance.

13

As demonstrated by the emphasized language in Section
5(a), a career service employee is not bound by the twenty
(2 0) working day limitation period if he/she can demonstrate
xv

excusable neglect" for not filing his/her grievance.

In

accordance with the Legislature's direction, the CSRB has
defined excusable neglect to be:
xw

Excusable neglect' means the exercise of
due diligence by a reasonably prudent
person and constitutes a failure to take
proper steps at the proper time, not in
consequence of the person's own
carelessness, inattention, or willful
disregard in the processing of a grievance,
but in consequence of some unexpected or
unavoidable hindrance or accident." R1371-2(2004)(Emphasis supplied).
As demonstrated herein, Petitioners' objective fear of
retaliation by the UDOC constitutes excusable neglect that
tolled the twenty (2 0) working day limitation period in
dispute herein.
B, The Excusable Neglect Exception is a Legislative
Mechanism Created to Safeguard Employees' Grievance Rights
and Prevent Reprisals.
In the CSRB's organic statute, the Legislature
explicitly prohibited state agencies from taking reprisals
against employees.14

14.

At first blush, however, this statutory

U.C.A. 67-19a-303(3)(1991) provides:
14

prohibition appears to be meaningless because the CSRB's
organic statute does not vest the CSRB with any
jurisdictional authority to adjudicate issues involving
reprisals.15

As such, the Legislature did not give the CSRB

the power to directly remedy any violation(s) of the
reprisal prohibition statute but the CSRB's administrative
rule defining "excusable neglect" appears to address such

"(3) No person may take any reprisals against any
career service employee for use of grievance
procedures specified in this chapter."
Further, in the Utah State Personnel Management Act
(herein "the USPMA") at U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(g)(2000), the
Legislature required the Department of Human Resource
Management (herein "the DHRM") to design and implement a
career service system that includes:
Mg)
[P]roviding a formal procedure for
processing the appeals and grievances of employees
without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or
reprisal."
(Emphasis supplied).
15. The CSRB's jurisdictional statute does not include the
authority to adjudicate issues involving reprisals:
"(1)(a) The board shall serve as the final
administrative body to review appeals from career
service employees and agencies of decisions about
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions,
written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of
personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable
administration of benefits, reductions in force,
and disputes concerning abandonment of position
that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in
the grievance procedure." U.C.A. 67-19a-202(1991).

15

management misconduct by denominating the same as an
"unavoidable hindrance."

H.O. Zabel concurred with the

foregoing legal analysis in his Decision dated January 8,
2001, to-wit:
"To allow an administration to create or
maintain an atmosphere in which employees are
afraid to exercise their rights and lay claim
to benefits for which they qualify, because
they know that such an exercise will result in
adverse personnel action, is contrary to the
intent and purpose of the Personnel Management
Act. Therefore, this Hearing Officer must
agree with Grievants [Petitioners] that fear
of retaliation prior to July 1997 was
sufficient on the facts of this case to
constitute an unavoidable hindrance, and
imbued Grievants' failure to file a timely
grievance with excusable necrlect for purposes
of §67-19-401 (5) (a) . "16 (Emphasis supplied).
H.O. Zabel7s decision is underpinned by the wellestablished legal principle that a statute of limitations is
tolled when the party asserting the same (i.e., the UDOC)
either engages in misconduct or there exists other
exceptional circumstances that make application of the
statute of limitations "unjust or irrational."17

16.

S<ee, Exhibit B at page 10. (R. 000373).

17.

As recently noted by the Utah Supreme Court:

Thus, H.O.

"Thus, 'statutes of limitations begin
running upon the happening of the last
event necessary to complete the cause of
16

Zabel appeared to suggest that if Petitioners had filed
their grievance in July of 1997, they would have been
entitled to the "made whole" relief sought in their
grievance.

The CSRB disagreed with H.O. Zabel and held, as

a matter of law, that an objective fear of retaliation does

action.' Burkholz
v. Joyce,
972 P.2d
1235, 1236 (Utah 1998). In certain
instances, however, the discovery rule
tolls the limitations period until facts
forming the basis for the cause of action
are discovered. Id. at 50-51. The
discovery rule applies:
(1) in situations where the discovery
rule is mandated by statute; (2) in
situations where plaintiff does not
become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment
or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would
be irrational or unjust, regardless of
any showing that the defendant has
prevented the discovery of the cause
of action. Warren v. Provo
City
Corp.,
838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah
1992)(footnote citations omitted).
'Under the discovery rule,' Nthe
limitations period does not begin to
run until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of
action.' Berenda,
914 P.2d at 51
(quoting O'Neal v. Div. of
Family
Servs.,
821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah
1991)(quoting Myers,
635 P.2d at
86))." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.2d 742,
753 (Utah 2002)(Emphasis supplied).
17

not constitute excusable neglect:
vv

In reaching our decision herein, the Board
notes that the statutory framework set forth
in the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures
Act can only protect an employee from actual
retaliation not from fear, whether real or
supposed, of such retaliation. By failing to
file their grievance when the xvevent"
occurred, Appellants essentially stripped the
CSRB or its Hearing Officer of the ability to
protect them against actual retaliation. The
Board cannot allow this conduct any more than
it could allow retaliation or reprisal against
an employee exercising his or her right by
submitting a grievance. This Board feels that
any other ruling by it in the instant case
would only foster what the statute explicitly
prohibits. For this reason, the Board finds
as a matter of law, that fear of retaliation
in and of itself, is insufficient to establish
"excusable necrlect" under our rules. "
(Emphasis supplied). See, the CSRB's Decision
at page 27 set forth in Exhibit A in the
Addendum. (R. 000516).
The CSRB's legal conclusion is erroneous for a myriad
of reasons.

First, the CSRB presumes that it has the

jurisdictional authority and power to adjudicate
reprisal/retaliation issues when, in fact, the Legislature
has not granted to the CSRB such jurisdictional authority.1
The CSRB's analysis is therefore underpinned by, and
premised upon, the false belief that it has authority to
address management misconduct involving

18.

See, footnote 15.
18

reprisal/retaliation.

Second, the CSRB's reliance upon the

false premise that it has jurisdictional authority to
address reprisal/retaliation would necessarily result in
fostering and encouraging management misconduct because
employees would have no recourse in the grievance process.
Third, the CSRB's analysis effectively renders meaningless
the Legislature's statutory prohibitions regarding
reprisal/retaliation.

Simply stated, the CSRB's analysis

suggests that employees may only pursue a grievance
involving actual retaliation when, in fact, the employee has
no right to pursue such a grievance.

And finally, the CSRB

incorrectly interprets its own administrative rule defining
excusable neglect:

H.O. Zabel correctly determined that an

objective fear of retaliation constitutes an unavoidable
hindrance that would equate to excusable neglect.
C»
Petitioners' Objective and Reasonable Fear of
Retaliation Post-July 23, 1997, was Sufficient to Constitute
Excusable Neglect.
Since the pervasively hostile work environment
described herein was sufficiently hostile and intense so as
to establish excusable neglect19 as to the Petitioners'

19. Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a
statute of limitations (once tolled because of *duress")
does not begin to run until the "duress" is terminated, see,
19

potentially filing of a grievance as of July of 1997, the
question thus becomes - at what point in time after July of
199 7 did the pervasively hostile environment abate (if ever)
such that excusable neglect no longer existed the time lines
for filing a grievance under the Grievance and Appeals
Procedures began to run?20
E.D. Haun testified that it takes seven (7) years to
change a culture as deep seated as that found in the UDOC:
"A. [By E.D. Haun] I think it takes,
according to research that I've
done, and it's a very interesting
question - it takes seven years to
change a culture, and especially one
as deep seated as I think the
corrections department had. And I
don't think it started with the
prior administration. I think the
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984), Petitioners
submit the applicable time period for filing their grievance
had not expired when they filed their grievance. In fact,
E.D. Haun's admission that the *culture" in the UDOC had not
changed by the time he left the UDOC in 2 0 01 persuasively
suggests the time period for the Petitioners to file their
grievance had not yet, as a matter of law, commenced running
when they actually filed the same.
20. In particular, Mr. Carver's attempt to convince
Petitioners to dismiss their grievance after the issuance of
ALJ Robinson's Report suggests that coercion and
intimidation continued well after Petitioners filed their
grievance. The additional five (5) examples of
reprisal/retaliation discussed in the text, infra, further
suggest the Petitioners' fear of retaliation was real subjectively and objectively - long after their grievance
was filed.
20

culture that developed there started
years and years ago, probably
couldn't put a finger on it.
I would like to think that we made
some inroads. One of the very great
concerns of mine of retiring when I
did was that I hadn't given it the
seven or eight years that I
identified would be needed to make
some very significant grounds. I
will say this, that I know that the
governor gave my successor explicit
instructions to continue down that
road...
Q.[By Mr. Dyer] Do you think you
overcame that perception while you
were still there?
A. Not totally. I'm not naive."
(R. 000525)(Transcript at pages 2062 07)(Emphasis supplied).
E.D. Haun's uncontroverted testimony that it would take
seven

(7) years to change the culture of fear of retaliation

and retribution within the Department undermines H.O.
Zabel's conclusion that Petitioners did not establish
excusable neglect.

In fact, there was no evidence, let

alone substantial evidence, in the record to support H.O.
Zabel's Decision that the culture magically changed on July
23, 1997, when E.D. Haun was appointed.
Further, there were five (5) examples of retaliation to
demonstrate an ongoing fear at the time Petitioners filed.
E.D. Haun appointed Fred Van Der Veur (herein "Van Der

21

Veur") as Director of the Division of Institutional
Operations (DIO).

Van Der Veur had a reputation among the

Department as being "someone you did not want to cross."
000525 (Transcript at pages 59-62, 105-106, 124-125).

R.

The

first two (2) examples under the Haun administration involve
Van Der Veur and Warden Hank Galetka (herein "Warden
Galetka") exercising unlawful authority consistent with
prior administrations.
First, Warden Galetka ordered Petitioner Harold Johnson
to change his scores from interviews on a promotion
evaluation because one of the people Van Der Veur wanted to
promote was too low on the list.
pages 141-144).

R. 000525 (Transcript at

Johnson talked to E.D. Haun in his office

about this situation, however, nothing was done about it.
Id.

Even ALJ Robinson had *heard about it."

T.62.

Second, Petitioner Tim Slocum was retaliated against by
Warden Galetka and Van Der Veur for not wearing his pager
24/7:
XV

Q. So you started working for Mr. Vandevere.
Then what happened?

A. And it was funny, we had - there was
an incident at the prison, and of course
I never - I didn't work for the warden at
that time Hank Giletka, I was working
directly for the division director. They
had -paged me and they had called me on my
22

cell phone. I did not return the page or
the call because I turned my pager and
cell phone off at five o'clock.
Q.

Because you weren't in QIC?

A. I weren't in QIC and we're not paid
to have our pagers and cell phones left
on.
Q.

This is after the grievance?

A.

Correct. So I had happened to walk
into the warden's suite, and he
cruestioned me why I did not respond
to a page or the cell phone because
they needed me at the incident. I
said, "Because I have it turned off."

And he says, "Well, if you worked
for me, you would have it turned on."
And I says, "Well, I don't work for
you." And that was the end of the
conversation.
Well, it was interesting that and you know, our evaluations come along
later that year, you have a midterm or
you're supposed to have a midterm, which
I've never had a midterm most of the
time, and I received my performance - my
evaluation from Director Vanderveur and
he had recommended a satisfactory.
Q.
A.

As opposed to one of the exceptional
ratings?
Right.

Q.
Was this the first time you'd ever had a
satisfactory?
A.

First time.

Q.

And how did you -

A.

In -

23

Q.

I'm sorry, go ahead.

A.
And that's probably in - you know,
and I'm only recalling from the
evaluations I had received, because I
haven't received an evaluation every year
because it doesn't happen sometimes.
Q.
What was your perception as to why
you received that lower evaluation?
A.
That I had challenged or mocked,
however you want to call it, somebody of
higher authority.
Q.
Do you believe it was directly
related to this not having the pager and
cell phone on?
A.
Yes, yeah, for not having my pager and
cell phone, of course, because that was the
conversation." R. 000525 (Transcript at pages
159-162)(Emphasis supplied).
The third and fourth instances involved a continuation of
the prior administration's use of transfers as a form of
retaliation. Third, Supplemental Finding No. 18 found that Mr.
LaBounty was involuntarily transferred during the Haun
administration.

See T.102-104.

Fourth, Grievant Leatham was

also involuntarily transferred under the Haun/Van Der Veur era
and had been previously involuntarily transferred under the
McCotter/Bartlett era.21

T. 121-122.

21. Under the McCotter/Bartlett administration, Petitioner
Leatham testified that before Bartlett became Deputy
Division Director, Leatham had challenged certain decisions
of Bartlett. When Bartlett became the Director, he
transferred Leatham from the position of Bureau Chief to a
Deputy Warden of Housing at Mt. Timpanogas. Not only did
this change Leatham's status and significantly lower the top
24

And fifth, just before the remand hearing on December 5,
2002, Leatham had been told by the warden that they were
strongly considering moving him to the Training Academy to work
as a training coordinator, a substantially lower position.
Twice before in Leatham's 2 7 years with the Department, he had
been involuntarily moved to substantially lower positions, under
the McCotter/Bartlett era and under the Haun/Van Der Veur era.
Due to the Grievance, his position was threatened again.
D. Petitioners Had an Objective Fear of Retaliation,
Thereby Establishing Excusable Neglect, Tolling' the Statute
of Limitations, and Entitling Petitioners to an Award of Pay
for On-Call Time Compensation Beyond the Twenty (20) Days
Prior to the Filing of their Grievance,
UDOC should not be permitted to reap a windfall gain by
virtue of its own misconduct.

It is undisputed that Petitioners

had an objective fear of retaliation based on years of

of his salary range but also the Bureau Chief position that
he was transferred from two (2) months later was offered a
12% raise that Leatham would have received had he not been
transferred for speaking out and challenging Bartlett on
certain issues. R.000525 (Transcript pages 121-122).
Similarly, under the Haun/Van Der Veur administration,
during the organizational changes, Leatham was re-assigned
as Bureau Chief over Administrative Services for
approximately a month, however, Leatham was vocal in
challenging administration and a month later, Van Der Veur
reassigned Leatham as a Correctional Administrator over
Security, with significantly less responsibility. Leatham
spoke with E.D. Haun about his concerns, and E.D. Haun only
told Leatham that he would have to take it up with Van Der
Veur. Van Der Veur in turn told Leatham that "if you don't
like it, you can quit or retire..." R. 000525 (Transcript
pages 122-124).
25

intimidation by the prior administrations of the UDOC.

There is

no question that the Petitioners have been wronged, that
Petitioners worked for and earned the on-call compensation that
they seek.

The UDOC knowingly and willfully refused22 to pay

Petitioners any on-call compensation until July of 1997, and
only OIC (officer in charge) compensation after June of 1997.
There is also substantial evidence of continued intimidation and
unlawful exercise of authority constituting retaliation during
the post-Haun administration supporting an ongoing fear at the
time of and subsequent to the filing of Petitioners grievance.23
For example, H.O. Zabel made explicit findings that the
Executive Director McCotter, who immediately proceeded Mr.
Pete Haun, had engaged in direct threats and retaliation
against the Department's ALJ as late as July 7, 1997.

R.

22. The undisputed testimony of ALJ Robinson established
that both the Haun administration and the predecessor
McCotter administration were aware of their obligation to
pay on-call time. R. 000525 (Transcript p. 66-67).
However, the undisputed testimony of Petitioners was that
UDOC, prior to the Haun administration had always told them
that they were not entitled to any on-call pay, and during
the Haun administration that they were only entitled to oncall compensation when performing OIC duties. R. 000525
(Transcript p. 115-8, 140-1, 150-1, 157-9). UDOC should not
be allowed to use its own misconduct to justify "taking''
Petitioners' rights to receive compensation for on-call time
by asserting Petitioners' claim is time-barred.
23. See, footnote 20 and the five (5) examples of
retaliation provided in the text hereinabove.
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000366.

The Department's ALJ, R. Spencer Robinson, also

explicitly testified that, in his opinion, "objective"
excusable neglect continued to exist after Mr. Haun took the
helm of the Department through at least November of 1997.
R. 000525 (Transcript p. 87, lines 4-25).

That the H.O.

made no finding regarding ALJ Robinson's testimony on this
issue further supports Petitioners' contention that
substantial evidence exists in the record to demonstrate
excusable neglect existed long after E.D. Haun assumed the
position of Executive Director of the Department.

H.O.

Zabel and the CSRB's decision that the excusable neglect
immediately dissipated is untenable in light of the record
evidence.
Mr. Haun's own uncontroverted testimony was that it
takes seven (7) years to change a culture of intimidation
and retaliation:
XN

Q. [BY MR. DYER] In your mind, did you ever
overcome the perceptions and the - A. [BY MR. HAUN] I think it takes, according
to research that I've done, and it's a very
interesting question - - it takes seven years
to change a culture, and especially one as
deep seated as I think the corrections
department had. And I don't think it started
with the prior administration. I think the
culture that developed there started years and
years ago, probably couldn't put a finger on
it.
I would like to think that we made some

27

inroads. One of the very great concerns of
mine of retiring when I did was that I hadn't
given it the seven or eight years that I
identified would be needed to make some very
significant grounds. I will say this, that I
know that the governor gave my successor
explicit instructions to continue down that
road.
Q. So from your perspective, that's still an
on-going process in terms of solving fears of
retribution?
A. I hope - - yes...
0. Do you think you overcame that perception
while you were still there?
A. Not totally, I'm not naive." R. 000525
(Transcript p. 206, lines 3-22, T.207, lines
19-21). (Emphasis supplied).
E.
The CSRB's Decision Fails to Contain Sufficient
Findings of Fact that Would Justify Its Determination
Regarding Excusable Neglect Thereby Warranting Reversal of
the CSRB's Decision,
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32
(Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this Court explicitly held that
administrative agencies must provide sufficiently detailed
findings of fact to support the ultimate conclusions reached
or suffer reversal:
"While it is true that the CSC [Career
Service Council] stated its ultimate
conclusions, administrative bodies may not
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate
conclusions... [FN8 ]
FN8. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
described the detail required in
administrative findings in order for a
reviewing court to protect the public
from "arbitrary and capricious
administrative actions." Milne Truck
Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378...
28

To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate factual
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed
fact and law, are reached. See
generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such
findings, this Court cannot perform its
duty of reviewing [an administrative
body's] order in accordance with
established legal principles and of
protecting the parties and the public
from arbitrary and capricious
administrative action." Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32
(Ut.Ct.App. 1991)(Emphasis supplied).
Neither the CSRB's Decision, nor H.O. Zabel's Decision
of January 8, 2 001, contain any explicit finding of fact
determining if, and/or when, Petitioners' excusable neglect
abated.

Absent such an explicit finding of fact,

Petitioners submit that the CSRB's Decision must be
reversed.
II
THE UDOC'S MISCONDUCT TOLLED THE TWENTY (20)
WORKING DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THEREBY
WARRANTING REVERSAL OF THE CSRB'S DECISION
As noted in Spears,24 a party cannot claim the benefit
of the statute of limitations when it has engaged in

24. See, the quoted text from the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Spears that is set forth in footnote 17
hereinabove.
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''concealment or misleading conduct'' or exceptional
circumstances warrant the tolling of the applicable statute
of limitations.

Petitioners respectfully submit that a

global view of the record in this case reveals that the UDOC
engaged in concealment, misleading conduct and
coercion/intimidation that created a culture of fear of
reprisals/retaliation by career service employees.

Thus,

arguendo, Petitioners respectfully submit that Petitioners
are entitled to have the twenty (20) working day statute of
limitations deemed to be tolled in the event this Court
disagrees with the Petitioner's analysis of the CSRB's
Decision regarding excusable neglect.

Simply stated, the

UDOC should not be permitted to engage in serious misconduct
and then utilize that serious misconduct as a shield against
liability arising directly from that misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court
reverse the CSRB's Decision and order the UDOC to rightfully
award Petitioners' on-call compensation in a fashion

30

consistent with their "made whole" request contained in
their grievance.
DATED this

^4

K

day of

2004.

Respectfully submitted,

Pnillip W. Dyer, Esq.
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
Attorneys for Petitioners
MI/E /client/UPEA/UGOP/Leatham/Appeal Brief (Court of Appeals)
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